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Abstract 
Drawing on the institution-based view and the global political economy perspective, this study 
examines the role of home-country government support and interstate relations in the overseas 
subsidiary performance of Chinese multinational enterprises (MNEs). We focus on two aspects of 
home-country government support: financial support and non-financial policy support, as well as 
their effects under the contingency of interstate relations. Using survey data, we find that Chinese 
MNEs’ subsidiary performance is positively related to the degree of home-country government non-
financial policy support, but not financial support. The impact of non-financial policy support is 
contingent on interstate political and economic relations. Stronger interstate political relations 
complement the impact of non-financial policy support on subsidiary performance, whereas 
interstate economic relations have a substitutive effect.  
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Home-country government support, interstate relations and the subsidiary performance of 
emerging market multinational enterprises 
1. Introduction  
The growing importance of emerging economies in the world economy accompanied by the 
surge of outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) by emerging market multinational enterprises 
(EMNEs) has drawn widespread academic attention (Demirbag and Yaprak, 2015; Keohane and 
Underdal, 2011). One stream of existing research has focused on the role of home-country 
institutions, such as governments, in motivating and regulating EMNEs (Luo et al., 2010). Findings 
of existing studies show that home-country government support compensates for EMNEs’ lack of 
international experience and ownership disadvantages, and helps explain the puzzle concerning why 
these new contenders have rapidly internationalized in a short period of time (Lu et al., 2014). 
While extant research has enhanced our understanding of whether home-country government 
support influences motivation and entry mode selections of OFDI by EMNEs, little attention has 
been paid to whether such support can be translated into post-entry performance (Hoskisson et al., 
2013). This omission limits our understanding of the role of the home-country government as a 
source of competitive advantage through EMNEs’ institutional embeddedness at home and abroad.  
Moreover, extant research based on the institutional perspective has assumed that the impact 
of institutional forces on MNEs’ operations is confined within national borders, thus providing few 
insights into the institutional impact associated with the broader international political and 
economic relations (Demirbag et al., 2010). As countries are embedded in the international context, 
home-government policies shaping firms’ activities abroad are subject to the approval of host-
country governments (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011). This implies that the effect of home-country 
government support on EMNEs’ overseas performance may vary, depending on the level of 
interaction and the strength of interstate relations between a firm’s home government and the host 
country (Lattemann et al., 2017). In this study, we define interstate relations as the alignment and 
coordination of national interests in global affairs between a firm’s home-country and the host-
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country government (Dai et al., 2013; Jandhyala and Weiner, 2014), including interstate political 
relations and economic relations.  
Drawing on insights from the global political economy (GPE) perspective, we consider 
interstate relations as boundary conditions of EMNEs’ post-entry performance. GPE scholars 
emphasise the role of a set of commonly accepted rules and norms by a group of countries in 
governing their relationships with each other (Claes and Knutsen, 2011). While the principles and 
rules underpinning interstate relations may not have any binding or legally enforceable power, they 
help to promote information flow and reduce uncertainty, as well as facilitating cooperation at 
interstate level, and hence enabling countries to pursue national objectives through engaging in 
cross-border economic exchanges (Keohane and Underdal, 2011).  
Both the institutional and the GPE perspectives highlight the impact of rules and norms on 
cross-border economic exchanges. The latter embraces the importance of institutional forces 
operating at transnational level in shaping firms’ international operations. It is crucial to take 
account of both home-country government support and interstate relations to understand the 
implications of broad institutional embeddedness for EMNEs’ international success (Child and 
Marinova, 2014). 
China is chosen as our research setting as Chinese firms have recently expanded their 
operations globally. A total of 24,400 Chinese firms had set up operations in 190 countries by 2016 
(MOFCOM, 2017). The rise of Chinese MNEs and the role played by their home-country 
government in terms of offering support to firms’ overseas activities, and engaging in interstate 
cooperation, present an important opportunity to advance our knowledge of the relationship 
between home-country government support, interstate linkages and EMNEs’ post-entry 
performance.  
This study makes three main contributions to the literature on EMNEs. First, instead of 
assuming the immobility of contextual forces and only examining the impact of home-country 
government policy on business operations within national borders, we look at whether such 
  
5 
 
institutional forces travel abroad with firms and exert extra-territorial influence on their overseas 
performance. The home-country government often provides information and diplomatic assistance, 
in addition to resource access, when firms operate internationally (Luo et al., 2010), We expand 
extant literature on the generic proposition about home-country government support by 
distinguishing between the impact of two critical aspects of home-government support on EMNEs’ 
post-entry performance, namely financial and non-financial policy measures. 
Second, we extend the existing research which builds upon the institution-based view by 
incorporating insights from the GPE perspective. While the effect of both home and host-country 
institutional forces on EMNEs’ international expansion has been documented (Lu et al., 2014), 
research has tended to neglect the fact that countries are embedded in the wider context of interstate 
relations (Demirbag et al., 2010). By juxtaposing the institution-based view with insights from the 
GPE perspective, we examine the broader impact of institutional forces beyond national borders by 
capturing the importance of interstate cooperation in facilitating cross-border economic activities at 
transnational level. In doing so, this research expands the theoretical boundaries of the institutional 
perspective to interstate contexts, thus broadening our understanding of institutional contextual 
forces beyond the national boundary.  
Third, our research responds to the call by international business scholars to broaden the 
impact of political and economic factors beyond traditional institutional forces on MNEs’ 
performance (Doh et al., 2012; Mellahi et al., 2016). We systematically examine two types of 
interstate relational factors: political relations and economic relations between a firm’s home and 
host countries, to capture their heterogeneous effects on EMNEs’ post-entry performance. Home-
country government support interacts with interstate contextual forces in different ways so that 
these institutional forces can either reinforce or substitute for home-country government support to 
boost EMNEs’ post-entry performance. Hence, examining interstate political and economic 
relations helps to provide a more complete account of the interplay of institutional forces at 
domestic and interstate levels in shaping EMNEs’ post-entry performance.  
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2. Theoretical background and hypotheses  
Institutions have been defined as a set of external isomorphic pressures that lay down legitimate 
norms with respect to how things should be conducted in a given organizational field (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Peng, 2016). As firms are embedded in the institutional context, 
conformity to institutional prescriptions of appropriate conduct helps them to gain legitimacy from 
powerful institutional constituents (Baum and Oliver, 1992). Institutional embeddedness refers to 
the interconnections or institutional linkages between firms and key institutions in the environment 
in which they operate (Oliver, 1997). Such embeddedness increases firms’ likelihood of success by 
facilitating resource access and acting as a buffer to protect them from environmental uncertainty 
(Hung, 2005). EMNEs are embedded in the institutional contexts of both home and host countries. 
Home-country embeddedness implies that EMNEs can obtain support from their home-country 
government when their strategy is aligned with their government. This is the case for Chinese 
MNEs, given that the Chinese government has adopted the ‘going global’ strategy as a strategic 
pathway for economic development at country level, and has implemented policies, including both 
financial and non-financial support, aimed at promoting Chinese firms’ international expansion (Lu 
et al., 2014). Thus, home-country government support can represent an enabler which enhances the 
international competitiveness of its MNEs.  
As emerging economies have become increasingly integrated with the global market, the 
governments of these countries have realized that supporting their firms to become world-class 
MNEs can project their influence beyond national boundaries (Child and Marinova, 2014). Thus, 
they become a powerful ally of EMNEs by not only offering direct support, but also indirect 
support, including the negotiation of interstate treaties with host-country governments to further 
enhance their firms’ competitiveness when operating in host countries (Hoskisson et al., 2013). 
However, the impact of government support channeled through interstate relations, has received 
little attention due to the assumption that institutional forces tend to be internationally immobile 
(Meyer et al., 2011). This overlooks the fact that countries are embedded in a broad international 
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context. The relationship between an EMNE’s home country and a host country may either enhance 
or constrain the effectiveness of home-country government support in an EMNE’s post-entry 
operations through institutional embeddedness in host countries. (Lattemann et al., 2017). Thus, it is 
important to unpack the role of home-government support in EMNEs’ international success by 
bringing in the GPE perspective in order to consider the impact of interstate relations on cross-
border business operations (Frieden and Martin, 2002).  
The GPE perspective concerns the interaction of economic and political phenomena across 
national borders and proposes that states are self-interested actors that will engage in cooperation 
with each other if there are sufficient shared interests (Keohane, 1984; O’Brien and Williams, 2013). 
Cooperation among states is based on a mutual desire to increase the efficiency of cross-border 
economic exchanges, which are facilitated through a process of policy coordination where countries 
adjust their policies so that adverse consequences of decisions to their counterparts are reduced 
(Keohane and Underdal, 2011). Therefore, the impact of one government’s policies is no longer 
limited by its national borders but can trigger reactions from other countries which will 
consequently influence MNEs’ operations in those countries (Ravenhill, 2008).  
GPE scholars propose that a set of rules, norms, and decision-making procedures which 
have been accepted by a group of countries as regulating their relationship may serve as a 
mechanism to facilitate economic cooperation between countries (Keohane and Underdal, 2011; 
Ruggie, 1975). These rules and norms can provide the basic institutional infrastructure that governs 
trans-boundary economic activities (Keohane, 2012). As countries are increasingly embedded in 
world political and economic systems, adherence to commonly accepted rules and practices in the 
international arena not only helps them to gain opportunities to cooperate with one another, but also 
affects domestic policymaking, and are useful institutional devices for governments that wish to 
pursue complementary interests at interstate level (Claes and Knutsen, 2011). The presence of 
international relations not only helps to promote communications at intergovernmental level, but 
also reduces the transaction cost in economic exchanges when engaging in interstate cooperation 
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(Jandhyala and Weiner, 2014). By integrating institutional embeddedness with the GPE perspective, 
our study expands existing research focusing on within-country institutions by suggesting that 
interstate relations may interact with domestic institutional forces in affecting EMNEs’ post-entry 
performance.  
2.1 Home-country government support  
From the institutional perspective, a government as the primary actor in the institutional 
environment plays an important role in shaping economic exchanges through policy instruments 
(Lu et al., 2014). As governments in emerging economies are supportive of OFDI, embeddedness in 
the institutional context of the home country and alignment with the government’s strategy enables 
EMNEs to gain home-country government support, including subsidies and favorable legislative 
changes that are important to firms’ overseas success (Meyer et al., 2011). Due to under-developed 
market mechanisms, the influence of the home-government policies of emerging economies tends 
to be stronger in affecting their firms’ international operations than that of developed countries 
(Hong et al., 2015). In this study, we investigate both financial and non-financial policies to unpack 
the effect of home-country government support on EMNEs’ overseas performance.  
2.1.1 Home-country government financial support  
EMNEs are deemed to have weak ownership advantages in their internationalization process (Luo 
and Tung, 2007), which leads to difficulties in securing financial access in host countries (Yiu et al., 
2007). However, home-country government support can compensate for EMNEs’ competitive 
disadvantages so that they can better compete against their counterparts in two main ways (Lu et al., 
2014). First, direct financial support from the home-country government provides a valuable 
resource which can help EMNEs overcome financial constraints when venturing abroad (Luo et al., 
2010). Such support can enable EMNEs to access state funds at below market rates when engaging 
in international operations (Buckley et al., 2007). Credit support offered by policy banks, for 
example the Export-Import Bank of China, can provide greater financial security for Chinese MNEs’ 
global expansion and help them reach global customers and develop distribution networks, thus 
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contributing to growing their market share in the international market (The Economist, 2013). 
Moreover, the provision of financial resources may enable Chinese MNEs to employ host-country 
skilled personnel and gain access to advanced technologies that complement firms’ existing 
resources. The combined and enlarged resource base helps Chinese MNEs build their competitive 
advantages and enables them to better serve customers in overseas markets, which can boost their 
overseas performance.  
In addition to cheap capital provided by state banks, relaxed control on the financial markets 
by the home-country government in relation to payback terms may satisfy firms’ need for easier 
capital access (Hoskisson et al., 2013). The liberalization of home-country financial markets may 
give EMNEs confidence when devoting resources to developing new products that help to generate 
a higher sales margin abroad. A longer payback period alleviates firms’ financial stress and offers 
greater financial flexibility, thus enabling them to integrate strategic assets acquired abroad with 
firms’ existing assets to create a new source of competitive advantage (Commercial Bank M&A 
Loan Risk Management Guidelines, 2015).  
Hypothesis 1a: Chinese MNEs’ overseas subsidiary performance is positively related to the level of 
home-country government financial support.  
2.1.2 Home-country government non-financial policy support 
Home-country governments not only provide financial support, but also non-financial support. The 
non-financial policy support of a home-country government refers to schemes aimed at streamlining 
the administrative process, the provision of information and the protection of firms’ overseas rights. 
Policy support in non-financial forms not only helps firms to reduce operational costs, but also 
serves as a competence-enhancing device to augment EMNEs’ international competitiveness (Peng, 
2012). There are three main channels through which home-government non-financial policy support 
may affect EMNEs’ post-entry performance.   
First, a supportive home-government policy helps firms cut operational costs and improve 
efficiency as the streamlining of administrative procedures reduces the bureaucracy involved in 
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business activities (Luo et al., 2010). With a more efficient administrative environment, EMNEs are 
able to respond to foreign market opportunities in a swifter manner. This helps EMNEs compete 
more effectively abroad. For instance, China’s ‘go-global’ strategy has prompted the government to 
provide a ‘one-stop’ service to review firms’ OFDI projects. Investments under $1billion no longer 
need to be approved, although the home government needs to be notified (MOFCOM, 2014). This 
enables Chinese companies to reduce the costs of dealing with multiple state authorities, and 
dedicate resources to research and development in order to introduce tailored products to the local 
market, thus contributing to increasing market share abroad. 
Second, policy support offered by the home-country government plays a key role in helping 
firms to enhance their knowledge base, which can help overcome constraints due to their lack of 
experience as latecomers (Lu et al., 2011). A critical barrier that hinders EMNEs’ global success is 
related to their lack of knowledge about foreign markets. By offering effective information support 
regarding a host country’s market climate, the home-country government enables its firms to adopt 
appropriate marketing strategies. Guidelines published by the home-country government help 
EMNEs to develop a better understanding of host-country consumers’ demands which enables 
EMNEs to overcome the liability of foreignness.   
Finally, a home-country government’s policy support may enhance EMNEs’ post-entry 
performance by providing risk-safeguard mechanisms to shield firms from complex host 
environments and facilitate communications between MNEs and host-country stakeholders. The 
presence of home-government agencies abroad can offer two types of support at the post-entry stage. 
First, diplomatic support safeguards cross-border business operations in the face of increasing 
international political risks. The Chinese government has helped Chinese firms to develop risk 
control systems for overseas subsidiaries through its personnel training programs and enhanced 
consular support (Luo et al., 2010). These provide effective protection to Chinese MNEs’ assets and 
personnel abroad, and reduce operational costs. Second, home-government agencies abroad can 
boost EMNEs’ competitiveness by acting as a bridge to link firms with host-country government 
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and business communities so that firms can become better embedded in host markets and work with 
reliable local partners to pursue success. For example, an important mission of the Chinese 
commercial consulates abroad is to help firms communicate with host-country governments and 
business networks (Foreign Affairs, 2016). This can help Chinese MNEs adapt their operational 
standards to meet host-country government requirements and collaborate with local suppliers and 
distributors to develop new products and pre-empt the market. 
Hypothesis 1b: Chinese MNEs’ overseas subsidiary performance is positively related to the level of 
home-country government non-financial policy support.  
2.2 The moderating role of interstate relations 
Cross-border operations imply that MNEs are embedded in multiple institutional 
environments (Demirbag et al., 2010). Differences in institutional pressures between home and host 
countries make embeddedness challenging as it increases the transaction cost of monitoring and 
coordinating in foreign markets (Buckley and Munjal, 2017). We suggest that strong interstate 
relations between firms’ home and host countries enable national governments to coordinate 
policies, hence moderating the impact of home-country government support on EMNEs’ post-entry 
performance. This study considers two mechanisms at the interstate level. The first is interstate 
political relations, which is the degree of foreign policy alignment between a firm’s home 
government and host governments (Dai et al., 2013). The second is interstate economic relations, 
such as investment agreements reached at intergovernmental level (Jandhyala and Weiner, 2014). 
Political and economic issues constitute the most important components of interstate relations, 
which is the main reason why we focus on these two mechanisms (Desbordes and Vicard, 2009).   
2.2.1 Interstate political relations 
EMNEs are subject to the jurisdictions of both home and host governments. These not only regulate 
domestic policies, but also manage interstate political relations, which in turn affect cross-border 
economic activities (O’Brien and Williams, 2013). The political frameworks at domestic and 
international levels are intertwined and jointly impact on business operations (Keohane, 2005). 
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Hence, interstate political relations between home and host countries may act as an institutional 
device to reinforce the effectiveness of home-country government support on EMNEs’ post-entry 
performance. 
Interstate political relations and home-government financial support 
Governments with favorable political relations tend to work in a co-operative manner in economic 
affairs as shared foreign policy positions promote trust and information symmetry at interstate level 
(Flores-Macías and Kreps, 2013). With stronger interstate political relations, countries are more 
likely to engage in discussions in the financial policy domain that helps to establish a network for 
government officials, such as finance ministers, with regular patterns of interaction (Keohane, 
1984). This enables the home-country government to communicate with the host-country 
government more effectively in relation to the financial support packages that it offers to firms, thus 
enhancing acceptance of such support by the host country (Ikenberry and Lim, 2017). Chinese 
MNEs often carry the identity of their home-country government in the eyes of host countries, 
especially when they receive financial support from the government (Cui and Jiang, 2012). This has 
raised national security concerns in some countries as they suspect that Chinese MNEs come with a 
political agenda (Globerman and Shapiro, 2009). However, countries with good political relations 
with China may have established trust through past interactions (Gao et al., 2015). This helps to 
alleviate concerns over national security (Li and Vashchilko, 2010) regarding Chinese MNEs 
receiving support from their home-country government. As a result, such support may be seen in a 
positive light and reach its full potential in helping EMNEs acquire strategic assets in the host 
countries, thus avoiding disruption.  
With the presence of close interstate political relations, the policies followed by one 
government may be viewed by the other as conducive to the realization of its own interests 
(Keohane, 1984). Hence, the host government may be more willing to cooperate by introducing 
incentives to accommodate firms’ home-government financial support. Good interstate political 
relations may prompt the host government to adopt a MNE’s home-country currency as method of 
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payment, which helps to reduce transaction costs in cross-border operations. Host-country 
governments with favorable political relations with China may be willing to cooperate with the 
Chinese government in monetary issues such as the internationalization of the RMB (Financial 
Times, 2015). Chinese MNEs can benefit from such cooperation as it lowers the cost associated 
with exchange rate fluctuations if the RMB is accepted as the trading currency, and this can further 
boost the positive effect of home-country government financial support on firms’ post-entry 
performance.  
Hypothesis 2a: The positive relationship between home-government financial support and Chinese 
MNEs’ overseas performance is stronger when there are stronger political relations between China 
and the host country.  
Interstate political relations and home-government non-financial policy support  
With stronger interstate political relations, countries are likely to adjust their behaviour to expedite 
intergovernmental coordination among subunits of government (Keohane, 2005). This facilitates 
home-country government interaction and communication with the host government, which enables 
the home-country government agencies to gather up-to-date information regarding host markets 
(Ikenberry and Lim, 2017). This knowledge can then be passed on  to EMNEs investing in these 
countries, thus helping them better understand local markets. Close interstate political relations may 
motivate the host-country government to provide updated information, thus complementing home-
country government policy support and further enhancing the effectiveness of home-country 
government policy support on EMNEs’ post-entry performance.   
In addition, when there is a greater degree of foreign policy alignment between countries, it 
promotes more institutionalized commitments at intergovernmental level (Li and Vashchilko, 2010), 
which enhance the effectiveness of the risk-safeguard mechanism provided by the home-country 
government. The host-country government may pay greater attention to the issues brought by the 
home-country government agencies as it may help to enhance political co-operation. Previous 
research posited that the co-operative interplay between firms’ home and host-country governments 
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in the international political system can provide useful leverage to protect cross-border operations 
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011). Thus, favorable political relations may serve as a risk-buffering 
mechanism (Doh et al., 2012) which enables local Chinese embassies to negotiate with the host-
country government more effectively for the protection of Chinese MNEs’ overseas assets and 
personnel safety.  
Hypothesis 2b: The positive relationship between home-government non-financial policy support 
and Chinese MNEs’ overseas performance is stronger when there are stronger political relations 
between China and the host country.  
2.2.2 Interstate economic relations  
International economic exchanges are characterized by common and conflicting interests on 
multiple economic issues, where countries may worry about being exploited (Keohane, 1984). As 
international institutions, such as the World Trade Organization, tend to be hampered by the 
difficulty of reaching deals and monitoring state behaviors at multilateral level, governments also 
negotiate economic agreements at interstate level that allow them to identify common interests and 
compromise on an acceptable scale (Jandhyala and Weiner, 2014).  
 The most prevalent interstate economic treaties are bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and 
double taxation treaties (DTTs) (Sauvant and Sachs, 2009). BITs are signed between pairs of 
countries to protect bilateral investments (Ginsburg, 2005). Similarly, DTTs are used to harmonize 
the calculation methods and definitions on tax subjects, and mitigate the uncertainty faced by 
investors in foreign fiscal systems (Barthel et al., 2010). As a specific institutional link between the 
home and host countries, interstate economic treaties may enhance EMNEs’ performance through 
defining legal rights, reducing uncertainty, and providing reliable information (Zong et al., 2012), 
thus reinforcing the positive impact of home-country government financial and non-financial 
support.  
Interstate economic relations and home-government financial support 
In order to promote OFDI, emerging economy governments have actively signed BITs and DTTs 
with other countries. BITs typically include a ‘national treatment’ clause that entitles foreign firms 
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from signatory countries to be treated equally in comparison with domestic firms (Jandhyala and 
Weiner, 2014). Such a clause creates institutional conditions through which EMNEs are better able 
to be embedded in the local context, thus reducing the liability of foreignness. It confers EMNEs 
with the legal rights of participating in the host-country’s financial market and receiving financial 
support from host-country FDI promoting agencies, which reduce the costs of accessing overseas 
assets by Chinese MNEs. As financial support offered by the Chinese government can come with 
performance requirements (Luo et al., 2010), gaining access to the host-country financial market 
serves as an alternative source of financial resources and alleviates firms’ reliance on home-country 
government financial support.   
DTTs provide MNEs with the immediate benefit of cost saving. Standardisation of tax 
between treaty partners reduces the burden of paying tax to both their home and host countries 
(Blonigen and Davies, 2004). Compared with financial support from the home-country government, 
DTTs may be a better received option as some host governments consider subsidies provided by the 
home-country government a source of unfair competition (Globerman and Shapiro, 2009). In this 
regard, BITs and DTTs facilitate economic exchanges between EMNEs and host-country firms, 
thus enhancing the local embeddedness of EMNEs. As a result, BITs and DTTs may act as 
substitutes for home-country government support for EMNEs’ post-entry performance.  
Hypothesis 3a: The positive relationship between home-government financial support and Chinese 
MNEs’ overseas performance is weaker when there are stronger economic relations between China 
and the host country.  
Interstate economic relations and home-government non-financial policy support 
Interstate economic agreements provide effective protection for firms with regard to dispute 
settlement and double taxation avoidance, which reduces uncertainty facing EMNEs when 
operating in the host country (Sauvant and Sachs, 2009). As most treaties have specific clauses to 
govern disputes between investors and the host-country government, they have enabled firms to 
seek arbitration without the need to involve the home-country government in the process (Jandhyala 
and Weiner, 2014). The adoption of an arbitrational approach under economic treaties may reduce 
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the need for diplomatic support from local Chinese embassies, thus easing political scepticism. As a 
result, the risk-safeguard mechanism provided by home-government support can be replaced by 
well-defined bilateral economic treaties for Chinese firms’ overseas performance. 
Additionally, the enforcement of interstate economic treaties can be an alternative channel 
for firms to obtain detailed and country-specific information, which can reduce their reliance on 
information provided by the home government. A typical BIT provides information regarding 
MNEs’ entitlement to national treatment, and compensational mechanisms in the event of 
nationalization (Sauvant and Sachs, 2009). Similarly, the implementation of DTTs between 
countries inform firms on tax issues including tax relief on specific projects and dispute settlement 
procedures between firms and host-country tax bureaus. Hence, the presence of interstate economic 
treaties may provide more specific information regarding the host-country’s investment and 
taxation policies than the general guidance from EMNEs’ home-country government.  
Hypothesis 3b: The positive relationship between home-government non-financial policy support 
and Chinese MNEs’ overseas performance is weaker when there are stronger economic relations 
between China and the host country.  
3. Sample and data 
We tested our hypotheses using survey data on Chinese enterprises’ OFDI collected by the China 
Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT) in 2011. The sample contained firms 
from 16 provinces and municipalities across China.
1 
Due to cost and administrative constraints, we 
approached 2,000 firms that were the CCPIT’s membership enterprises and also appeared on the 
MOFCOM’s registration list for their OFDI activities. The target respondents were in charge of 
firms’ international strategy and investment activities. A practitioner-based report was offered as an 
incentive to encourage participation. After the original mailing, and one follow-up reminder, we 
received a total of 365 questionnaires. Responses that were either incomplete or inapplicable were 
eliminated. This provided us with 183 observations. To examine the relevance of interstate political 
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and economic relations, we excluded OFDI flowing to regions that are not members of the General 
Assembly of the United Nations (UNGA). Our final sample consists of 148 observations.  
In relation to regional and industrial distributions, our sample firms covered 51 host 
countries and three industrial divisions including the agriculture industry, the mainstream industries 
and the service industry based on the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), 
revision 3. Table 1 presents a breakdown of our sample by region and industry with weightings 
relative to the sample size in comparison to the population. The regional and industrial distributions 
of the sample firms are consistent with those of the original population. 
Insert Table 1 here 
3.1 Measurements 
Overseas subsidiary performance. The dependent variable is the overseas subsidiary performance 
of a Chinese firm. Objective financial data are not easily accessible in emerging markets, and thus 
the use of perceptual data becomes appropriate. This measure helps us understand the values and 
priorities that corporate executives place on specific objectives (Hult et al., 2008). The construct 
was operationalised by asking the respondents to indicate their satisfaction with their firm’s most 
recently established overseas branches on a 7-point likert scale (1 = very dissatisfied, 7 = very 
satisfied) regarding three items: (i) sales growth, (ii) local market share growth, and (iii) sales 
margin growth.  
Home-country government financial support. Home-country government financial support was 
measured by the actual level of support the sample firms received from home-country governments 
in terms of financial and capital access in their overseas investment (1= very low support, 7= very 
high support).  
Home-country government policy support. Home-country government policy support was 
operationalised by asking the respondents to evaluate the level of policy support that they received 
during overseas expansion on a 7-point scale in terms of (i) simplifying the approval of foreign 
investment, (ii) simplifying procedures for firms to demonstrate sufficient capital in foreign 
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currency, (iii) investment guideline by industries, (iv) the protection of firms’ rights overseas, and 
(v) investment guideline by countries.  
Interstate political relations between China and a host country was measured by Voeten et al.’s 
(2013) Affinity of Nations Index.
2
 This index is based on countries’ voting behaviours in the 
UNGA in 2010. States with stronger political relations tend to share more similar foreign policy 
positions in international affairs (Dai et al., 2013). Within the index, the affinity between any two 
countries at any point in time falls in the range of -1 to 1. In which, -1 indicates that two countries’ 
voting behaviors at the UNGA are completely dissimilar and 1 suggests that they are identical 
(Gartzke, 2006). Hence, the higher values indicate a stronger political relationship between two 
countries. 
Interstate economic relations was operationalized using the number of BITs and DTTs enforced 
between China and a host country. Data on BITs were drawn from the UNCTAD database.
3 
DTT 
data were extracted from the China Commerce Yearbook 2011.  
Control variables. At country level, we controlled for host-country risk using the World 
Governance Indicators (WGI) 2010.
4 
To allow for a comprehensive interpretation, we rescaled the 
index by using 2.5 minus the original scores for all observations so that 0 means best governance 
quality while 5 indicates the most risky environment. Furthermore, we used the marketization index 
published by China’s National Economic Research Institute to capture variations in regional 
marketization (Fan et al., 2010). We also included a dummy variable to capture whether a 
multilateral investment agreement is assigned between China and host countries (1 = Yes, 0 
otherwise). The data were drawn from UNCTAD database.
5
 Moreover, the impact of home-country 
government support may vary between developed and developing countries (Kolstad and Wiig, 
2012). We accounted for such a difference using a dummy variable (1 = OECD countries, 0 
otherwise). Lastly, we used the natural logarithm of air miles between Beijing and a foreign capital 
city to control for geographic distance between China and a host country. The data were drawn 
from the French Research Centre in International Economics database (CEPII).
6
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 At industry level, we controlled for host-country industry growth using the annual growth 
rates for value added in respective industries in 2010.
7
 The data were collected from the database of 
World Development Indicators. Moreover, we accounted for differences in industry 
competitiveness between firms’ home and host countries using three items from the survey. The 
respondents were asked to compare: (i) difficulties in obtaining raw materials, (ii) difficulties in 
obtaining technology for innovation, and (iii) completion of upstream and downstream industries, 
between China and the host country. 
At firm level, we controlled for firm size as the natural logarithm value of total employees, 
and host-country experience by the number of years that a firm has operated in a host country (Wu 
and Lin, 2010). We also included dummy variables to control for a firm’s ownership status  
(1=SOE, 0 otherwise) and the adoption of risk assessment strategies ( 1=Yes, 0 otherwise)..   
4. Results  
4.1 Common method bias 
As some variables were drawn from the same survey respondents, this may entail a threat of 
common method bias (CMB) (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). We adopted several practices to address 
this concern. First, we tested for this potential issue by performing the Harman single-factor test 
(Podsakoff et al., 2003). The result indicates that the single factor model demonstrated a poor fit to 
the data, which only accounted for 10% of the variance.  
Second, we adopted a Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) approach to identify potential 
CMB. Following Guo et al. (2014), we compared the fitting indices between a model loading all 
items onto a common latent factor and a model loading all items onto their theoretical constructs. 
Pairwise tests for all factors show that a three-factor model fits our data better in all cases.  
Third, as several of our hypotheses concern the interaction effects between home-
government support and interstate relational factors, it is unlikely that CMB would be included in 
our results. It has been suggested that the complex data relationship shown by the predicted 
interaction effect is not explained by CMB because the respondents are not able to anticipate the 
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researchers’ interaction hypotheses so as to provide biased answers (Ma et al., 2011). Additionally, 
some of our variables, such as interstate economic relations and firm size, are objective which 
effectively reduces the amount of spurious correlations among the variables in our model 
(Brouthers et al., 2013). These practices together with a questionnaire completion guide, which 
guaranteed confidentiality of the responses, are likely to enhance the accuracy of our responses 
(Danis et al., 2010). Therefore, we are reasonably confident that CMB is unlikely to be a major 
concern in our study. 
4.2 Constructs’ reliability and validity  
Descriptive statistics and variable correlations are presented in Table 2, and variance inflation 
factors are well below the acceptable level of 10 (Neter et al., 1985), indicating no multicollinearity 
issue. We assessed the reliability of our multi-item constructs by examining their internal 
consistency with Cronbach alpha. The internal consistency values for all constructs were above 0.70. 
We conducted CFA to test the convergent and discriminant validities for these multi-item constructs. 
Our CFA model fits the data well, with all indices meeting their respective criteria (χ2(113) = 
186.188; p<0.001; CMIN/DF=1.65; CFI=0.97; RMSEA=0.06; NNFI=0.97) (Appendix A). The 
variance extracted from our constructs is greater than the threshold value of 0.50 and larger than the 
squared correlations between the two constructs (Hair et al., 2006) (Appendix B), providing 
evidence for discriminant validity.  
 
Insert Table 2 here  
 
4.3 Hypotheses tests and results 
The results using the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression are presented in Table 3. Model 1 in 
Table 3 is a baseline model. Model 2 introduces the independent variables, home-country 
government financial support and non-financial policy support. We included the moderating 
variables one by one in Model 3 and Model 4. Model 5 is a full model with all the variables. 
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For the main variables, as the coefficient of home-country government financial support is 
statistically insignificant, Hypothesis 1a is not supported. By contrast, the coefficient of home-
country government non-financial support is positive and statistically significant in Model 5 
(β=0.56, p<0.001). The result lends support for Hypothesis 1b that Chinese MNEs’ overseas 
subsidiary performance is positively related to the level of home-country government non-financial 
support.  
For the interaction effect between home-government financial support and interstate 
political relations, the coefficients of their interaction terms in Model 3 and Model 5 are statistically 
insignificant. Hence, Hypothesis 2a is not supported. Conversely, we find support for Hypothesis 2b. 
The coefficients of the interaction effect between home-country government non-financial support 
and interstate political relations are positive and statistically significant in Model 3 (β=0.13, p<0.05) 
and Model 5 (β=0.14, p<0.05). This suggests that favourable interstate political relations strengthen 
the positive impact of home-country government non-financial support on subsidiary performance.  
For the joint effect of home-government financial support and interstate economic relations, 
the coefficients of their interaction terms are positive but statistically insignificant in Models 4 and 
5, which do not support Hypothesis 3a. By contrast, the coefficients of the interaction terms 
between interstate economic relations and home-government non-financial support are negative and 
statistically significant in Model 4 (β=-0.21, p<0.05) and Model 5 (β=-0.22, p<0.01). This suggests 
a substitutive effect between home-country government non-financial policy support and interstate 
economic relations. Thus, Hypothesis 3b is supported.  
                                         Insert Table 3 here 
We follow Brambor et al. (2006) and further examine the marginal effects of the 
independent variables at different values of moderators through plotting graphic displays. Figure 1 
depicts the marginal effect of home-country government financial support on Chinese MNEs’ 
overseas performance when interstate political relations between China and the host country 
become stronger. As shown in Figure 2, there is an upward slope for the marginal effect of home-
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country government non-financial support on Chinese firms’ overseas performance when interstate 
political relations between China and the host country reach a higher score. This indicates that when 
a better interstate political relation presents, the positive impact of home-government policy support 
on Chinese MNEs’ subsidiary performance becomes stronger.  Figure 3 presents the marginal effect 
of home-country government financial support on Chinese MNEs’ overseas performance given the 
degree of interstate economic relations between China and the host country. Figure 4 shows that the 
marginal effect of home-country government non-financial support on Chinese firms’ overseas 
performance diminishes when both BIT and DTT have been implemented between China and the 
host country. The downward slope indicates that there is a substitutive effect between non-financial 
support and the strength of interstate economic relations. Specifically, when interstate economic 
relations are equal to 2, the marginal effect of non-financial support on subsidiary performance 
becomes insignificant. This suggests that as the degree of interstate economic relations becomes 
stronger, the impact of home-country government non-financial support on firms’ performance 
becomes negligible. Additionally, we have conducted robustness checks and detailed information is 
included in Appendix C.   
Insert Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4 here. 
  
   
5. Discussion and conclusion  
5.1 Main findings and contributions 
 
This study examines the impact of home-country government financial and non-financial 
support on Chinese firms’ overseas performance and the extent to which their effects are moderated 
by interstate political and economic relations. We have obtained several interesting findings. First, 
our empirical evidence shows that supportive home-government policies in non-financial domains 
enhance EMNEs’ overseas subsidiary performance, whereas financial support does not have such 
an impact. This suggests that non-financial policy measures, such as information support, the 
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streamlining of administrative processes and increasing diplomatic protection can directly enhance 
Chinese firms’ post-entry performance through increased efficiency and reduced operational costs. 
Unlike developed country MNEs, EMNEs rely substantially on government support to build their 
competitive advantages (Hong et al., 2015). This finding complements previous research (e.g. Lu, et 
al., 2014) by demonstrating that home-country government non-financial support not only 
motivates firms to undertake OFDI but also generates a performance-enhancing effect. Such 
support in the form of information provision and institutional protection for overseas business is 
vital for newcomer EMNEs. It also implies that EMNEs face challenges in host countries due to a 
lack of foreign market knowledge. Home-country government non-financial support helps address 
their weakness in post-entry operations, thus improving firm performance.  
We did not find empirical evidence that home-country financial support boosts Chinese 
MNEs’ post-entry performance. A number of reasons may explain this non-significant effect. First, 
the finding may suggest home-country government support in the form of easy access to financial 
resources may not be directly translated into firms’ competitive advantage (Buckley et al., 2018). 
Additionally, our result may indicate that home-country government financial support alone has a 
limited impact on EMNEs’ post-entry performance, which may be largely driven by EMNEs’ 
competitive advantages and the industry competition of host countries. Our finding implies that 
government financial support is powerful in facilitating foreign entry, but firms may face challenges 
in utilizing such support to improve post-entry performance in host countries.  
Second, our study pays particular attention to the role of interstate political relations in 
EMNEs’ cross-border operations and finds empirical support that interstate political relations serve 
as a promoting device to augment the positive links between home-country government non-
financial support and EMNEs’ international success. The findings reflect the fact that firms are 
embedded in both home and host countries, and thus their international activities are influenced by 
interactions between governments at interstate levels (Child and Marinova, 2014). Existing studies 
predominantly stress the relevance of within-country institutions for MNEs’ operational 
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effectiveness (Makino and Tsang, 2011). However, government involvement in firms’ cross-border 
operations can raise political concerns (Globerman and Shapiro, 2009). This implies that EMNEs 
can suffer from the liability of country of origin. This is particularly true with Chinese firms, which 
are often considered to carry political missions with their OFDI (Cui and Jiang, 2012). Therefore, 
investing in countries with good political relations with their home country can help firms minimise 
negative images associated with their national identity, as home-country government support may 
be seen as less intrusive or even represent a positive signal in these countries. Furthermore, the 
Chinese government and embassies are more likely to be influential in countries with close 
interstate political relations. As such, they can provide support and protection for their firms when 
needed. Thus, strong interstate political relations serve as an institutional device which helps 
EMNEs embed in the local institutional environment. Increased local embeddedness enables these 
firms to gain public support and access local knowledge, thus enhancing subsidiary performance. 
However, we did not find support for the interaction effect between home-government financial 
support and interstate political relations. This non-significant result may indicate that post-entry 
performance is largely driven by firm-level competitiveness and industry conditions rather than 
country-level factors (Hoskisson et al., 2013). While strong interstate political relations allow 
Chinese firms to use their financial resources to purchase valuable assets in the host country, it may 
take time to reconfigure firms’ existing and acquired resources to enhance performance (Peng, 
2012).   
Third, our findings suggest that interstate economic treaties and home-country government 
non-financial support substitute for each other in affecting Chinese MNEs’ overseas success. 
Interstate economic treaties serve as an alternative source of country-specific information, which 
can be more beneficial than the guidelines issued by the home-country government. Therefore, 
strong interstate economic relations can replace the promotional measures of the home-country 
government in helping firms achieve overseas success. By contrast, our finding suggests that the 
interaction between home-country financial support and interstate economic relations is 
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insignificant. One possibility is that as relatively new players in the international marketplace, 
Chinese MNEs may lack the ability to strategically capitalize on the potential benefits of interstate 
economic treaties, such as tax reductions and tariff exemptions.  
Our study contributes to the existing literature on EMNEs in three main ways. First, this 
study goes beyond examination of what motivates EMNEs to undertake OFDI by focusing on their 
post-entry performance. While research has shown the influence of supportive home-government 
policies in encouraging the international expansion of EMNEs (Hoskisson et al., 2013), little is 
known about their impact upon these firms’ post-entry performance. Our study fills this research 
gap by showing that home-country government non-financial support can serve as a means of 
improving EMNEs’ overseas performance. We move beyond generic home-country government 
support by differentiating between financial and non-financial policy measures. Thus, the findings 
contribute to a better understanding of the factors affecting EMNEs’ overseas success. As EMNEs 
are in the early stage of internationalization, knowledge provision and institutional protection are 
more important elements than financial support in shaping their post-entry performance.   
Second, this study broadens research on EMNEs by combining insights from institutional 
embeddedness and the GPE perspective. Our integrative framework offers a broader perspective for 
understanding the sources of a firm’s competitive advantage and captures the impact of the 
interconnection between domestic institutions and interstate relations. Thus, this approach enables 
us to expand the theoretical boundary of the institutional perspective to interstate contexts. Firms 
operating across borders face multiple institutional pressures that arise from home and host 
countries, as well as their interplay in the international realm (Meyer and Peng, 2016). Extant 
research drawing on the institution-based view has focused on the impact of within-country 
contextual forces by assuming such contextual factors are internationally immobile (Demirbag et al., 
2010). We address this omission by bringing in the GPE perspective which emphasizes that 
countries are embedded in the broader international context, and thus interstate relations can 
augment the effectiveness of domestic policy (Jandhyala and Weiner, 2014). We propose, and find, 
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empirical evidence that the impact of the home-country government on firms’ overseas activities 
can be channeled through the interstate relations. By bridging the institution-based view with the 
GPE perspective, this study goes beyond identifying the direct effect of the domestic institutional 
environment by highlighting its interface with interstate relational factors in explaining EMNEs’ 
post-entry performance.  
Finally, our study complements existing research by showing that EMNEs’ international 
success not only directly links to home-country government support, but is also indirectly related to 
the strength of interstate political and economic relations. The findings reveal different mechanisms 
through which home-country government non-financial policy support interacts with interstate 
political and economic relations to influence EMNEs’ post-entry performance. While there is a 
complementary effect between interstate political relations and home-government non-financial 
support, interstate economic relations create an alternative institutional structure which helps to 
smooth cross-border business operations that substitute for home-government supportive policies. 
Thus, our study systematically delineates interstate political and economic relations as boundary 
conditions in shaping EMNEs’ international success. The findings offer a more nuanced 
understanding of the role of interstate political and economic relations and shed new light on 
existing research by highlighting the importance of considering the distinct effects of interstate 
relations on EMNEs’ post-entry performance.  
5.2 Implications 
Our study has a number of implications for practitioners and policymakers. For managers, first, our 
findings show that Chinese MNEs’ overseas performance is boosted by home-government non-
financial policy support but not financial support. This suggests that Chinese firms should leverage 
non-financial supportive measures to enhance their overseas performance while reducing reliance 
on home-government cheap finance. Second, our findings indicate that the impact of non-financial 
policy support is moderated by interstate political and economic relations. This implies that Chinese 
firms should utilize various non-financial schemes, such as diplomatic and information support, 
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when operating in countries that have good political relations with China. Additionally, they should 
develop a better understanding of the interstate economic treaties signed between China and other 
countries as these may facilitate economic exchanges with partner countries and help Chinese firms 
to obtain specific information regarding the host-country investment and taxation policies.  
For policymakers, our findings suggest that EMNEs’ home-country governments may 
consider offering non-financial policy support such as the streamlining of administrative processes 
and personnel training to assist their firms to compete globally. Moreover, active engagement at 
interstate governmental levels is desirable as it can be used as institutional leverage to extend the 
influence of domestic policy support in helping EMNEs’ to achieve international success. 
Establishing favorable political relations with host countries may augment the effectiveness of non-
financial policy support and help to boost the confidence of firms that operate in overseas markets. 
Additionally, the enforcement of BITs and DTTs with clauses dealing with investment and tax 
issues can provide EMNEs with alternative channels of information which enhance their 
commercial orientation.  
5.3 Limitations  
This study has several limitations which point to opportunities for future research. First, our 
dependent variable, subsidiary performance, was captured using managerial perceptual measures 
which may introduce the possibility of subjectivity. Given the multidimensional characteristics of 
business performance, future research should operationalise the construct with objective financial 
and operational measures. Second, due to the limitation of our data, we can only take a crude 
account of interstate relations and state ownership. More fine-grained measurements of these 
constructs, specifically taking into account both interstate co-operation and conflict, and the 
percentage of state-owned shares in a business, are certainly needed in future research. Finally, we 
used survey data to capture the actual level of support that firms received from their home-country 
government. Future research may consider looking at EMNEs’ headquarters and subsidiary links, 
and how this relationship influences the effect of home-country government support.  
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Table 1  
Industrial and regional distribution of the sample firms, in comparison with the population 
     
  
Industrial distribution of investing firms 
 
        Regional distribution of FDI location 
  
  
Agriculture 
Mainstream 
Industries 
 
Services 
 
    Asia Europe Africa 
  North 
America 
 Latin 
America    Oceania 
Sample (n=148) 
           Number 
 
     9 92 
 
47 
 
61 24 24 21 9 9 
Percentage (%) 6.1 62.1 
 
31.8 
 
41.2 16.2 16.2 14.2 6.1 6.1 
             Population (N=17,951) 
          Number 
 
    760 7,819 
  
9,601 9,627 2,421 2,054 2,458 829 562 
Percentage (%) 4.2 54.2 
  
53.5 53.6 13.5 11.5 13.7 4.6 3.1 
  Source: Base population data were compiled from 2011 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment 
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 Table 2 
 Correlation matrix 
  Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. Performance 3.91 0.81                               
2. Home-government financial support 3.23 0.85 0.14                             
3. Home-government non-financial 
policy support 
5.05 1.20 0.42** 0.185*                           
4. Interstate political relations  0.61 0.56 0.09 -0.02 -0.12                         
5. Interstate economic relations 1.56 0.61 -0.06 -0.09 -0.02 0.19*                       
6. Degree of marketization 9.36 1.40 0.15 0.34** 0.04 -0.01 -0.10                     
7. Ownership 0.26 0.43 -0.11 -0.16 -0.05 0.05 0.07 -0.16                   
8. Local experience 2.86 2.46 0.10 -0.02 -0.08 0.04 0.12 -0.12 -0.02                 
9. Risk assessment 0.86 0.35 0.26** 0.16 0.21** 0.05 0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.14               
10. Firm size 6.29 2.18 0.15 0.03 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.16* 0.28** 0.04 0.06             
11. Industry competitiveness between 
home and host countries 
3.19 0.95 0.13 -0.07 0.25** -0.23 0.28** -0.07 -0.07 0.00 0.12 0.03           
12. Host-country risk 2.07 1.17 0.09 -0.10 -0.05 0.00 -0.49 -0.09 -0.10 -0.13 -0.05 -0.25 -0.26         
13. Multilateral investment agreement 0.31 0.46 -0.10 0.09 -0.15 0.21** 0.29** 0.15 -0.06 -0.01 0.11 0.16 0.11 -0.25       
14. Geographical distance 8.27 0.69 0.03 -0.03 -0.10 -0.12 -0.04 0.00 0.10 -0.04 0.14 -0.13 0.01 0.06 -0.03     
15. Host-country industrial growth 0.06 0.12 -0.01 0.08 0.03 -0.13 0.04 0.16 -0.18 0.07 0.04 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.13 -0.03   
16. Developed vs. Developing country 
dummy 
0.38 0.48 0.05 -0.01 0.04 0.12 0.08 -0.15 0.15 0.01 0.04 0.14 -0.09 -0.06 0.05 0.05 -0.09 
  Sample = 148 
 *P<0.05; **P<0.01;  
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Table 3  
Results of regression analysis 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Main Variable      
Home-country government financial support   0.02 0.03 -0.11 -0.11 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.14) (0.14) 
Home-country government non-financial policy support  0.24*** 0.21*** 0.58*** 0.56*** 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.14) (0.14) 
Moderators      
Interstate political relations    0.13* -0.58 0.15* -0.57 
  (0.16) (0.36) (0.06) (0.35) 
Interstate economic relations   -0.02 -0.01 0.82Ɨ 0.82Ɨ 
  (0.12) (0.12) (0.48) (0.47) 
Interactions      
Home-country government financial support * Interstate political relations   0.01  -0.01 
   (0.12)  (0.05) 
Home-country government non-financial policy support * Interstate political relations   0.13*  0.14* 
   (0.06)  (0.06) 
Home-country government financial support * Interstate economic relations    0.07 0.08 
    (0.10) (0.10) 
Home-country government non-financial policy support * Interstate economic relations    -0.21* -0.22** 
    (0.08) (0.08) 
Control Variables      
Degree of marketization 0.10* 0.09* 0.09* 0.10* 0.09* 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Ownership -0.24 -0.19 -0.20 -0.16 -0.16 
 (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
Local experience  0.03 0.04Ɨ 0.04Ɨ 0.04Ɨ 0.04Ɨ 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Risk assessment 0.55** 0.32Ɨ 0.29 0.38* 0.35* 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17) 
Firm size  0.07* 0.05Ɨ 0.05Ɨ 0.05Ɨ 0.05Ɨ 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Industry competitiveness in comparison between home and host countries 0.14* 0.11 0.11 0.13Ɨ 0.13Ɨ 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Host-country risk  0.14* 0.13Ɨ 0.16* 0.13Ɨ 0.15* 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
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Multilateral investment agreement -0.28Ɨ -0.19 -0.17 -0.26Ɨ -0.24Ɨ 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
Geographical distance  0.02 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Host-country industry growth  -0.28 -0.20 -0.32 -0.01 -0.14 
 (0.53) (0.51) (0.51) (0.51) (0.51) 
Developed vs. Developing country dummy  0.15 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.12 
 (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Observations (N) 148 148 148 148 148 
R-square 0.14 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.29 
+P < 0.10; *P < 0.05; **P < 0.01; ***P<0.001 
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Figure 1. The moderating effect of interstate political relations on the relationship between 
Chinese MNEs’ overseas subsidiary performance and home-country government financial 
support. 
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Figure 2. The moderating effect of interstate political relations on the relationship between 
Chinese MNEs’ overseas subsidiary performance and home-country government non-financial 
policy support. 
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Figure 3. The moderating effect of interstate economic relations on the relationship between 
Chinese MNEs’ overseas subsidiary performance and home-country government financial 
support. 
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Figure 4. The moderating effect of interstate economic relations on the relationship between 
Chinese MNEs’ overseas subsidiary performance and home-country government non-financial 
policy support. 
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Notes 
1
 The sample firms are located in Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Chongqing, Shangdong, Guangdong, 
Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Hebei, Heilongjiang, Yunnan and Shaanxi. 
 
2
 The Affinity of Nations Index was first developed by Gartzke (2006) and updated by Voeten, 
Strezhnev and Bailey from 2008 onwards: http://pages.ucsd.edu/~egartzke/htmlpages/data.html   
 
3 
BIT data are available at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/42#iiaInnerMenu   
Accessed 10 August 2016 
 
4
 The WGI scores are available at: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports  
Accessed 10 August 2016 
 
5
 Multilateral investment agreement data are available at 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryOtherIias/42#iiaInnerMenu  Accessed 10 August 
2016  
 
6
 CEPII database are available at  
http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/download.asp?id=6 Accessed 8 April 2018.  
 
7
 Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate 
inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and 
degradation of natural resources.  
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Appendix A.  
Table A.1 Measurement model and CFA results 
Constructs Operational Measures of Construct Factor Loadings t-value 
Chinese firms’ overseas performance     
(Cronbach alpha=0.880) Satisfaction with sales growth  0.86  11.12 
 Satisfaction with local market share growth  0.88  11.21 
 Satisfaction with sales margin growth  0.79 Fixed 
Home-country government policy support    
(Cronbach alpha=0.943) Simplifying procedures for demonstrating firms have 
sufficient capital in foreign currency 
0.81  14.05 
 Simplifying the approval of foreign investment 0.80  13.56 
 Investment guidelines by industries  0.92  19.13 
 Protection of firms’ rights overseas  0.93  19.65 
 Investment guidelines by countries 0.92 Fixed 
Host-country risk    
(Cronbach alpha= 0.975) Voice and accountability 0.82  16.54 
 Political instability 0.85  18.57 
 Government effectiveness 0.98  38.48 
 Regulatory quality 0.98  37.86 
 Rule of law 0.99  45.38 
 Control of corruption 0.97 Fixed 
Differences in industry competitiveness between 
home and host countries 
   
(Cronbach alpha=0.766) Difficulties of obtaining raw materials 0.77  6.77 
 Difficulties of obtaining technology for innovation 0.71  6.68 
 Completion of upstream and downstream industries  0.70 Fixed 
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Appendix B.  
Table B.1 Discriminant validity 
 
Differences in industry 
competitiveness 
between home and host 
countries Host-country risk Performance 
Home-country 
government policy 
support 
Differences in industry 
competitiveness between 
home and host countries (0.73)       
Host-country risk 0.31 (0.94)     
Performance 0.11 -0.12 (0.85)   
Home-country government 
policy support 0.22 0.11 0.39 (0.88) 
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Appendix C. Robustness checks  
To deal with the issue of potential selection bias, we adopted Heckman’s (1976) two-
steps estimation to test the robustness of our results. In the first stage, a probit model 
is used to estimate the probability of Chinese MNEs entering countries with high 
political risks. We generated the inverse Mills ratio (IMR) by regressing firms’ 
characteristics and home-country government financial and policy supports on host-
country risk. Due to the absence of classification on governance quality under the 
WGI index, we used China’s governance score in 2010 as a benchmark (WGI, 2010). 
Under the WGI’s six dimensions in 2010, China scored -1.63 for voice and 
accountability, -0.66 for political stability, 0.10 for government effectiveness, -0.22 
for regulatory quality, -0.33 for rule of law, and -0.60 for control of corruption. We 
first take their mean value of -0.55. To allow comprehensive interpretation, we use 2.5 
minus China’s WGI score in 2010, i.e. 2.5-(-0.55) =3.05. For our analysis, countries 
that scored equal or higher than 3.05 indicate greater risk.  
In the second stage, we estimated overseas performance by including IMR as a 
regressor that captures sample selection bias. As reported in Table 3A, the IMR 
coefficient does not show any statistical significance in Models 1-5, which indicates 
the absence of such bias. The coefficient of our independent variable, home-country 
government non-financial policy support, and its interactions with interstate political 
and economic relations, remain similar to those reported in the initial OLS regression. 
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Table C.1 Results of robustness tests  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Main Variable      
Home-country government financial support   0.11 0.18 -0.01 0.04 
  (0.31) (0.31) (0.33) (0.33) 
Home-country government non-financial policy support  0.23*** 0.19** 0.57*** 0.54*** 
  (0.05) (0.06) (0.14) (0.14) 
Moderators      
Interstate political relations   0.13* -0.60Ɨ 0.15* -0.59Ɨ 
  (0.06) (0.36) (0.06) (0.35) 
Interstate economic relations   -0.02 -0.01 0.82Ɨ 0.82Ɨ 
  (0.12) (0.12) (0.48) (0.47) 
Interactions      
Home-country government financial support * Interstate political relations   -0.01  -0.01 
   (0.06)  (0.06) 
Home-country government non-financial policy support * Interstate political relations   0.14*  0.14* 
   (0.06)  (0.06) 
Home-country government financial support * Interstate economic relations    0.07 0.08 
    (0.10) (0.10) 
Home-country government non-financial policy support * Interstate economic relations    -0.21* -0.22** 
    (0.08) (0.08) 
Control Variables      
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.66 -1.63 -2.72 -1.69 -2.76 
 (1.40) (5.40) (5.37) (5.32) (5.28) 
Degree of marketization 0.12* 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 
 (0.05) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
Ownership -0.28 -0.07 0.00 -0.03 0.03 
 (0.18) (0.42) (0.42) (0.41) (0.41) 
Local experience  0.01 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.10 
 (0.03) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Risk assessment 0.54** 0.32Ɨ 0.29 0.37* 0.34Ɨ 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17) 
Firm size  0.03 0.15 0.22 0.16 0.23 
 (0.09) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) 
Differences in industry competitiveness between home and host countries 0.01 0.44 0.66 0.47 0.69 
 (0.28) (1.09) (1.09) (1.08) (1.07) 
Host-country risk 0.14* 0.13Ɨ 0.16* 0.13Ɨ 0.15* 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
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Multilateral investment agreement -0.28Ɨ -0.19 -0.17 -0.26Ɨ -0.24Ɨ 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
Geographical distance 0.02 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.06 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Host-country industry growth  -0.89 1.31 2.19 1.56 2.42 
 (1.41) (5.05) (5.02) (4.97) (4.93) 
Developed vs. Developing country dummy  0.15 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.12 
 (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Observations (N) 148 148 148 148 148 
R-square 0.15 0.24 0.26 0.27 0.29 
P < 0.10; *P < 0.05; **P < 0.01; ***P<0.001 
